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COMMENTS
FEDERALISM, MARRIAGE, AND HEATHER GERKEN’S
MAD GENIUS
KRISTIN A. COLLINS∗

In her characteristically astute and engaging essay, Professor Heather
Gerken offers a sensitive and sympathetic reading of Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v. Windsor.1 Her core claim is
that Windsor—and the transformation of political and legal support for samesex marriage in the United States—demonstrate how “federalism and rights
work together to promote change” and, in particular, how federalism furthers
the equality and liberty values of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This is a natural
line of argument for Gerken to develop with respect to Windsor, as she has
produced an incredible body of scholarship dedicated to what she calls the
“nationalist school of federalism”—a theory of federalism that understands
“state power [as] a means to achieving a well-functioning national
democracy.”3 We are fortunate that she has turned her attention to same-sex
marriage, federalism, and the “many mysteries” of Windsor.
I am delighted to offer this response to her essay. I begin by agreeing in
significant part with Gerken’s process-based account of how federalism has
helped facilitate the recognition of same-sex marriage in many states, and how
federalism provided jurisprudential resources for the Windsor Court as it struck
down the most significant provision in the Defense of Marriage Act.4
∗

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to Jim Fleming,
Courtney Joslin, Linda Kerber, Gerry Leonard, Reva Siegel, and Kate Silbaugh for
comments on an earlier draft of this essay, and to Sabina Mariella for research assistance.
1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2
Heather Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and
Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 594 (2015).
3 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1893 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, New Nationalism]. See also Heather K. Gerken, Our
Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012) [hereinafter Gerken, Our
Federalism(s)]; Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Foreword]; Heather K.
Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006); Heather K. Gerken,
Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
4 Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999)) (defining “marriage” as between one “man” and
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Federalism’s role facilitating the legal recognition of same-sex marriage in the
United States over the last decade is a well-observed and important
phenomenon. Federalism has provided laboratories of experimentation for
different resolutions of the debate over same-sex marriage; it has helped
manage and defuse that debate by lowering the stakes of different reform
initiatives; it has had a temporizing effect, pacing the rate of change; it has
generated healthy legal pluralism within our national system; and it has
provided individuals with opportunities for choice and exit.5 Gerken does not
so much disagree with these arguments as she contends that they do not
account for a key feature of Windsor’s “mad genius.” She understands Windsor
“not as an effort to accommodate political change, but as an effort to clear the
channels of political change” at the federal level.6 As she explains, “by getting
rid of [Section 3 of] DOMA,”7 Windsor forces the federal government “to
engage with the question of marriage equality” in administering federal
regulatory programs,8 thus allowing “the states [to] now tug the federal
government along with them.”9 It is through this “forced engagement”10 that
“federalism and rights work together to promote change.”11 “[R]ights and
structure,” Gerken explains, “are like two interlocking gears, moving the grand
constitutional project of integration forward.”12
As with her larger corpus of federalism scholarship, Gerken’s take on
Windsor, federalism, and same-sex marriage is founded on a complex and
textured understanding of federalism—one that eschews traditional narratives,
whether nationalist or state-centered in their orientation.13 She insists that we
pay attention to the many forms that federalism can and does take:
administrative federalism, polyphonic federalism, cooperative federalism,
uncooperative federalism, dynamic federalism, and horizontal federalism, to
name a few. There is no “one true federalism”14 in Gerken’s account: “Every
one “woman” for “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States”).
5 The literature on these points is vast. For a small sample, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of
Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005); Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism,
Liberty, and Equality Under United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117; Neil
Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 87 (2014).
6 Gerken, supra note 2, at 602.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 608.
9 Id. at 600.
10 Id. at 609.
11 Id. at 594.
12 Id. at 588.
13 See, e.g., Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 3.
14 I borrow this phrase from Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True
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flavor of federalism can be found somewhere in our system.”15 Importantly,
her work questions the descriptive accuracy and adequacy of sovereigntybased theories of federalism—theories premised on the notion that each state
has “power to rule without interference over a policymaking domain of its
own”16—while also observing the powerful hold of sovereignty on American
federalism jurisprudence.
Given the durable, even stubborn orthodoxy that “[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws
of the States and not to the laws of the United States,”17 one might be forgiven
for wondering how Gerken’s multi-dimensional, sovereignty-skeptical
approach to federalism could shed light on the subject of family law’s place in
our federated polity. If there is a North Star in sovereignty-based theories of
federalism, it is family law’s firm entrenchment at the state level, and the allied
notion that otherwise-legitimate federal regulatory and adjudicative powers
simply do not (or should not) reach family law and policy.18 It does not take
long to conjure examples that demonstrate the absurdity of the strongest
iterations of this conception of federalism and family law,19 but its power and
resilience is difficult to deny. Indeed, by Gerken’s count, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Windsor refers to the states’ special sovereignty over domestic
relations no fewer than eleven times. “The definition of marriage is the
foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic
relations with respect to the ‘[p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and
the enforcement of marital responsibilities,’”20 he opines. Therefore,
“[c]onsistent with this allocation of authority, the Federal Government, through
Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 829 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)).
15 Gerken, Our Federalism(s), supra note 3, at 1550.
16 Gerken, Foreword, supra note 3, at 12. See also Gerken, supra note 2, at 611.
17 In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (cited in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004);
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992)).
18 For discussions of this theory of federalism and family law, see generally Kristin
Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: Early Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’
Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 (2005); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
19 See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
(2000); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 258-77 (2000); JILL
ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992);
Collins, supra note 18, passim; Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 18, at 646-70.
See also sources cited infra notes 35-47 & 56-59.
20 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (quoting Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
AND THE
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our history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic
relations.”21 This refrain also bridges the majority and the three dissenting
opinions penned in Windsor, though the dissenters take the additional step of
proffering federalism as a basis for upholding state heterosexual-only marriage
laws.22 Gerken dismisses the sovereignty talk in the Windsor majority opinion
as “mostly claptrap.”23 But however one assesses the salience of state
sovereignty to Windsor’s outcome or reasoning, the opinion reflects and
reaffirms a durable but contested understanding of the place of the family in
our federal system.
What role will sovereignty-based theories of federalism play in the debate
over same-sex marriage as it unfolds in the coming months, years, and
decades? Could the nation’s experience wrestling with, and over, same-sex
marriage usher in a more nuanced federalism jurisprudence by demonstrating,
in a high-profile debate, the overlapping and concurrent nature of federal-state
allocations of power with respect to the family? Or will the sovereignty talk in
Windsor emerge as a lasting legacy? The latter possibility is suggested by
DeBoer v. Snyder,24 the Sixth Circuit’s post-Windsor opinion upholding
several states’ heterosexual-only marriage laws. According to the majority
opinion in DeBoer, state sovereignty—not equality or dignity—is the central
feature of Windsor’s rationale. “Windsor hinges on the Defense of Marriage
Act’s unprecedented intrusion into the States’ authority over domestic
relations,” explains Judge Jeffrey Sutton, and the same principle requires
deference to state heterosexual-only marriage laws.25
The DeBoer majority and the Windsor dissenters are not alone in
concluding that state sovereignty over marriage and family law weighs
strongly against, or even bars, recognition of a federal constitutional right to
same-sex marriage. That argument, which has taken various doctrinal
formulations, features prominently in briefs defending heterosexual-only
marriage laws in pre- and post-Windsor litigation.26 But among federal judges,
the DeBoer majority and the Windsor dissenters have thus far been in the
minority on this point. Prior to DeBoer, nearly every lower federal court had
interpreted Windsor’s rights-based reasoning to require states to recognize
same-sex marriage, dismissing or ignoring Windsor’s federalism talk as

21

Id.
Id. at 2696-97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
2720 (Alito, J., dissenting).
23 Gerken, supra note 2, at 601.
24 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
25 Id. at 400.
26 The state sovereignty argument has taken various forms and has been premised on
various doctrinal sources, from the Tenth Amendment to Article III. See, e.g., Brief for
Sixteen Utah Counties as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d
1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4178); Brief for Eagle Forum Educ.& Legal Def. Fund, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae, DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388 (No. 14-571).
22
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inapposite.27 As this Comment was going to press, the Supreme Court agreed
to review the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DeBoer.28
I have no crystal ball, nor will I offer an assessment of the role that
sovereignty-based federalism theories have played in the marriage-equality
debate thus far. Rather, I consider the descriptive shortcomings of state
sovereignty as a serviceable concept when trying to understand the allocation
of regulatory authority over family law and policy, past and present. In
Gerken’s work, jurisdictional lines are messy and overlapping, and the currents
of power run in multiple directions (up, down, sideways), through coordinate
branches (legislative, executive, judicial), and at all levels of government (from
the White House to city halls). Family law has been no exception to these
cross-currents of authority, a point I demonstrate in Part I with special attention
to the development and administration of federal marriage-based entitlements.
My account of the concurrency of federal and state authority in family law and
policy may not surprise those federalism scholars who, like Gerken, have
questioned sovereignty’s vitality and have embraced pluralistic understandings
of “our federalism.”29 But attention to the many ways that family law has been
subject to overlapping federal-state regulatory structures provides an important
corrective to juridical declarations of state autonomy in the field of family
law.30 It also sheds important light on a long history of contestation over the
metes and bounds of federal and state authority to regulate the family. The
marriage equality debates are part of that history, but as I demonstrate in Part
II, the debates over DOMA’s constitutionality were unusual in an important
regard: Sovereignty-based theories of federalism have often operated to thwart,
rather than facilitate, progressive change in family law and policy.
How might this history of regulatory integration and jurisdictional
contestation provide perspective on the current debate over the
constitutionality of state heterosexual-only marriage laws? In Part III, I take up
this question with an analysis of the sovereignty-based theory of federalism
developed in DeBoer. In Gerken’s account of Windsor and federalism’s role in
27

See infra notes 86-87 (collecting cases). In Robicheaux v. Caldwell, a judge in the
Eastern District of Louisiana upheld that state’s same-sex marriage ban, also citing
Windsor’s sovereignty language in support of his conclusion. 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 917 (E.D.
La. 2014).
28
DeBoer,772 F.3d 388, cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14571). The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in DeBoer addresses the constitutional claims raised in
four cases consolidated for appeal: DeBoer v. Snyder, Obergefell v. Hodges, Bourke v.
Beshear, and Tanco v. Haslam. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for writ of
certiorari in all four of those cases.
29 See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 3, at 10 (“My account . . . privileges messy overlap
over clear jurisdictional lines, and depicts power as fluid, contingent, and contested.”).
30 See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the
States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 273 (2009); Hasday, supra note 18; Sylvia Law,
Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 220 (2000); Resnik, supra note 18;
sources cited infra note 66.
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the growing acceptance of same-sex marriage, federalism’s complex structures
have helped facilitate healthy and robust debate over same-sex marriage and
have allowed some states to “tug” the nation toward recognition of marriage
equality. By contrast, the sovereignty-based theory of federalism offered in
DeBoer—founded on an account of state autonomy that fails to capture the
complexities of federal-state authority in the field of family law—would shield
marriage law from the horizontal and vertical dialogic processes that
federalism creates and supports. The historical perspective I offer in this
Comment makes plain that such an outcome is not an inevitable product of
fundamental federalism principles, and provides a cautionary reminder that—
as Gerken observes—“the gears of rights and structure” do not always move
forward.31
I
References to the special place of the family in our federated polity found in
Windsor and DeBoer are standard fare in accounts of American federalism—so
standard that they have assumed a transhistorical and essential quality.32 I
begin by asking what we might learn if, rather than trying to mine the historical
sources to determine the precise contours of federal power over family law
today, we analyze past practices for the purpose of determining how the
doctrinal and institutional structures of federalism have shaped family law in
the United States, and vice versa. What would we learn if, like Gerken, we
approached the subject with an eye for the overlapping and crisscrossing
exercises of power that characterize so much of American law and
governance? If we thought we might find as much concurrency as autonomy?
If we understood that federalism generates cooperation and contestation?
In framing my analysis in this fashion, my point is not to quarrel with the
fact that, as with most other areas of substantive law, state and local
governments have had a lead role in the creation and enforcement of the laws
that govern familial relations. Rather, I urge that sovereignty-based accounts of
the place of family law in our federal system—accounts that have been
developed in significant part in the course of legal contestation over calls for
reform—are both misguided and misleading. There is much we do not know
about the integration and overlap of local, state, and federal family laws and
policies. But based on what we do know, a far more interesting story about
federalism and family law can be told.
A brief account of the history of the federal government’s role in defining
marriage for federal-law purposes—the key issue in Windsor—illustrates this
point nicely. The first observation to be made is that federal-state regulatory
overlap in marriage law is not a modern development. At least a century before
31

Gerken, supra note 2, at 599-600. (“The arc of the universe may bend toward justice,
but the gears of rights and structure can move backwards, not just forwards.” (internal
citations omitted)).
32 See Collins, supra note 18, at 1763.
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the expansion of the federal regulatory state brought programs like Social
Security widows’ and dependent children’s benefits in the 1930s,33 federal
administrators had to determine women’s eligibility for federal widows’
military pensions.34 The military pension system may seem like a quaint relic
of a bygone era, but that perception is mistaken. It was a durable feature of
federal law from the 1790s into the early twentieth century,35 and its creation
and expansion helped spur the development of a significant federal
administrative apparatus in the early nineteenth century.36 In the second half of
the nineteenth century, Congress extended the pension system to reach widows
of the Civil War and other military encounters.37 As Theda Skocpol has
demonstrated in great detail, by the 1890s the Civil War pension system had
become America’s first social security system.38 World War I gave bloody
birth to a new generation of war widows, and Congress once again provided
for military widows in the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917 (“WRIA”).39 By
the time Congress enacted the Social Security Act of 1939—which extended
federal marriage-based entitlements to the general population—federal
administrators had been struggling with how to determine “what constitutes
marriage” for over a century.40

33

See Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 402, 49 Stat. 620, 627-28 (1935) (aid to dependent
children); Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360 (benefits for
wives and widows of eligible working men).
34 The following discussion draws on Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage:
Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the Legal Construction of the Family, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1085 (2009) [hereinafter Collins, Administering Marriage], and Kristin A.
Collins, “Petitions Without Number”: Widows’ Petitions and the Early Nineteenth-Century
Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter
Collins, Petitions].
35 For examples of early nineteenth-century federal widows’ military pension statutes,
see Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 52, § 1, 1 Stat. 390, 390; Act of Mar. 14, 1798, ch. 15, 1 Stat.
540, 540; Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 15, 2 Stat. 132, 135. These statutes are
representative. In the early nineteenth century alone, Congress enacted at least seventy-six
public law widows’ pension statutes. See Collins, Petitions, supra note 34, at 2.
36 See Collins, Petitions, supra note 34, at 6-16; Collins, Administering Marriage, supra
note 34, at 1122-30.
37 See, e.g., Act of July 12, 1862, ch, 165, § 2, 7 Stat. 566, 567.
38 See Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 3, 26 Stat. 182, 182-83; SKOCPOL, supra note 19,
at 120-30; see also Megan J. McClintock, Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of
Union Families, 83 J. AM. HIST. 456 (1996).
39 See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, §§ 200-405, 40 Stat. 398, 402-10. For a rich
discussion of provision made for wives and widows in the War Risk Insurance Act, see
Walter Hickel, War, Region, and Social Welfare: Federal Aid to Servicemen’s Dependents
in the South, 1917-1921, 87 J. AM. HIST. 1362 (1998).
40 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 557 (3d ed., Little, Brown 1857).
See Collins, Administering Marriage, supra note 34, at 1156-67.
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It turns out that defining marriage for the purpose of administering a
significant system of marriage-based entitlements was no mean feat. In the
early nineteenth century, for example, the question of when romantic
cohabitation crossed the line into legal marriage was open to dispute, as
marriage licenses were rare and common-law marriage was not unusual. In
light of that fact, for purposes of administering widows’ pensions, the federal
Pension Office issued a regulation in 1836 that established how the clerks in
that office were to assess the validity of an alleged marriage.41 Congress
followed suit in 1846, enacting a statute that defined marriage for the
resolution of widows’ pension claims.42 Although I have never set out to
identify the first federal statute governing how marriage would be established
for a federal program, that pride of place may go to the 1846 law, which
required that federal pension clerks recognize common-law marriages. As
explained by Attorney General John Mason, under the 1846 Act, “proof of a
marriage in fact cannot be required—that is, by witnesses present at the
ceremony, or by official records: general reputation and cohabitation are
sufficient, prima facie.”43
The problem of how to establish the legality of a marriage when
administering widows’ pensions became more difficult and contested as the
widows’ pension system grew during and after the Civil War. For example, in
1864, Congress enacted a special Civil War pension statute that allowed
widows of “colored soldiers” to prove marriage by providing evidence that the
couple cohabited for at least two years and recognized “each other as man and
wife,”44 if the couple had not been able to marry under state law. Slaves had
been denied the right to legally marry throughout the South. Thus, by
employing a generous definition of marriage for recently emancipated widows,
Congress sought to extend the material benefit of the pension laws to a class of
particularly needy and historically excluded women—a practice Congress

41

See Rules of Evidence in Widows’ and Orphans’ Claims, 9 July 1836, in PENSION
LAWS NOW IN FORCE, Doc. No. 118, 25th Cong. 2d. Sess. 102 (1838). Well before the
executive branch issued the 1836 regulation, pension administrators crafted their own
standards for determining the legality of a marriage. See Collins, Administering Marriage,
supra note 34, at 1134.
42 Act of May 7, 1846, ch. 13, § 2, 9 Stat. 5, 6.
43 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 496, 498-99 (1846).
44 Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389. The 1864 Act applied this liberal
standard only to couples who had been unable to marry under state law, but in 1866,
Congress omitted that qualifier. See Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, § 14, 14 Stat. 56, 58. For
discussions of Civil War pension statutes’ special provisions for widows and children of
“colored” soldiers, see ELIZABETH REGOSIN, FREEDOM’S PROMISE: EX-SLAVE FAMILIES AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 79-114 (2002); Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a
Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 251 (1999).

2015]

FEDERALISM, MARRIAGE, & MAD GENIUS

623

continued in 1873, when it extended this liberal definition of marriage to
widows of “Indian soldiers and sailors.”45
When Congress enacted WRIA in 1917, it once again employed liberal
definitions of marriage, bringing more women within the pension system.
WRIA created three different types of marriage-based entitlements for the
wives and widows of World War I soldiers: allotments, subsidized insurance,
and compensation (i.e., pensions).46 With respect to “allotments”—an
allowance for wives whose husbands were away fighting the war—WRIA
recognized common-law marriage as a basis for all women’s claims, regardless
of the woman’s race and with no mention of state law.47 For the wives and
widows of “colored or Indian soldiers and sailors,” WRIA went even further
by accepting evidence of common-law marriage as a basis for eligibility for
insurance and compensation—the two types of benefits provided to women
whose husbands died in battle—regardless of whether the marriage would
satisfy state law.48
In short, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the statutes that
created federal marriage-based entitlements regularly used both state and
federal standards to answer the question “what constitutes marriage?”49 As a
general matter federal administrators were expected to recognize marriages
that were legal under state law, and in some instances only state-sanctioned
marriages were recognized. But in a significant class of cases, federal
administrators were also to recognize unions as marriages even when state
officials would not.
This brief overview of the history of the federal widows’ pension system
suggests a far more complex, overlapping, intertwined picture of federal and
state authority with respect to marriage law than sovereignty-based theories of
45

Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 11, 17 Stat. 566, 570 (“[T]he widows of colored or
Indian soldiers or sailors . . . shall be entitled to receive the pension . . . without other
evidence of marriage than satisfactory proof that the parties were joined in marriage by
some ceremony deemed by them obligatory, or habitually recognized each other as man and
wife, and were so recognized by their neighbors, and lived together as such up to the date of
enlistment.”).
46 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, §§ 200-405, 40 Stat. 398, 402-10.
47 See id. § 22(5), 40 Stat. 398, 400-01. Here, I use the term “common-law marriage”
loosely, as WRIA appears to have required recognition of some relationships as marriages
that would not have satisfied most contemporary definitions of common-law marriage.
48 Id. WRIA accomplished this by reference to the 1873 Civil War pension statute. All
widows claiming compensation (i.e., a pension) or insurance were required to prove their
marriages in conformity with state marriage law, “except such [widows] as are mentioned in
section forty-seven hundred and five of the Revised Statutes,” i.e., Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch.
234, § 11, 17 Stat. 566, 570.
49 When Congress enacted the Social Security Act of 1939, it largely abandoned the
practice of providing a distinctive (and more generous) federal definition of marriage,
relying almost entirely on state law to define “wife” and “widow.” See Social Security Act
Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 209(i), (j), (m), 53 Stat. 1360, 1377-78.
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federalism allow, in turn raising important questions about the development of
marriage law in the United States. Did the integration of state and federal
definitions of marriage in the vast bureaucracy that developed to process
widows’ military pension claims for over one hundred years shape marriage
law in the United States? If so, how did the currents of causation run?
Generalizations should always be made with caution, and there is much we
simply do not know, but the historical sources suggest that federal
administrators may have played an underappreciated role in the development
of marriage-based entitlements and the legal definition of marriage. As I have
demonstrated elsewhere, a combination of ideological, fiscal, and institutional
pressures led federal pension clerks to resist recognition of widows’ pension
claims unless the widow produced record evidence of a formal, solemnized
marriage. This was the case in the early nineteenth century, when pension
clerks resisted recognizing widows’ pension claims based on common-law
marriage, despite federal and state law that directed otherwise.50 Similarly,
there is evidence to suggest that without record evidence of a formal marriage,
many African American Civil War widows struggled to have their
relationships recognized as marriages by pension administrators.51 When
World War I widows began filing claims, administrators in the Veterans’
Bureau again resisted recognition of common-law marriage. Indeed, one
administrator—a lawyer by the name of Otto Koegel—teamed up with
eugenicists in their active, vocal, and racially tinged campaign against
common-law marriage.52 Koegel identified the Veterans’ Bureau as “the
largest court of domestic relations in the world”53 and provided a thorough
critique of common-law marriage—one that continues to be cited.54
Did federal administrators’ resistance to common-law marriage play a role
in its demise under state law across the United States? It seems a reasonable
hypothesis that the increasing availability of federal marriage-based
entitlements like military pensions, along with federal administrators’
resistance to common-law marriage, helped push the states toward a more
legalistic, government-controlled definition of marriage. Similarly,
developments in state and local law—including increased use of vital
records—may have enabled federal administrators to make a stronger case

50

See Collins, Administering Marriage, supra note 34, at 1134.
Id. at 1160-62.
52 Otto E. Koegel, Common Law Marriage and Its Development in the United States, in
SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EUGENICS, 2 EUGENICS IN RACE AND STATE 252
(1921). In 1922, Koegel elaborated his analysis of common-law marriage into a freestanding treatise. See OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (1922).
53 Koegel, supra note 52, at 261.
54 See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 746 (1996); Jennifer Thomas, Common Law Marriage, 22 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 151, 154 nn.31-38 (2009).
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against recognition of common-law marriage. This historical record
demonstrates that one need not deny the states’ primary role in developing
substantive law in virtually every field, including family law, to also
acknowledge the important role that federal programs played in the
development of family law, not simply (or primarily) as part of a top-down
governance structure, but through integration of federal, state, and local law in
a significant administrative system. However, our understanding of how such
integration shaped family law remains underdeveloped in the shadow of
debates over whether the family is “truly local.”55
The complexities of overlapping regimes of federal and state family law are
not buried in the archives; they are hiding in plain sight in our modern
regulatory regimes. Today, all sorts of federal regulatory statutes and programs
concern “domestic relations,” and, pursuant to federal spending powers,
several federal laws require the states to adopt certain legal family-status
definitions. As anyone who followed the legal challenges to DOMA knows,
that list includes over one thousand federal laws that mention the word
“spouse,” including all manner of provisions in the tax code, the Social
Security Act, statutes governing veterans’ benefits, and immigration law.56 In
addition, a whole host of federal laws provide financial assistance to families
in need, establish requirements on how states define and prove the parent-child
relationship, and help determine how states will enforce parental
responsibilities.57 Some of these federal statutes are administered by federal
officials, some by state officials.
How have the power-sharing arrangements that characterize these laws and
programs shaped family law in the modern era? Thanks to Gerken’s rich and
energetic work on federalism, along with that of other scholars who have
probed federalism’s many mysteries, we have a more complex and
sophisticated understanding of the varied and diffuse ways that federalism
influences the development of American law. But sovereignty theories obscure
the complexities of the regulatory regimes that create and administer modern
American family law, a fact that may help explain why we lack a reliable
overview of how federalism’s many structures and doctrines shape family law
today.
55 Among histories of marriage, Nancy Cott’s Public Vows is an important exception, as
it examines how “public direction of marriage took place simultaneously on all three
levels”—i.e., national, state, and local. COTT, supra note 19, at 24.
56 Letter from Barry Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Accounting Office, to
Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 8-9, 42-44
(Jan. 31, 1997), available at http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf.
57 See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 331, 110 Stat. 2105, 2227; Full Faith and Credit for Child Support
Orders Act, Pub. L. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063, 4064-65 (1994); Child Support Recovery Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403; Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, 2354 (1975); Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”), Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401-404, 49 Stat. 627 (1935).
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For example, without even considering the more exotic species of
federalism that Gerken and others have explored—administrative federalism,
horizontal federalism, and “federalism all the way down”—to my knowledge,
we do not have a clear account of state officials’ responses to the classic topdown operation of federal laws that directly impact which familial
relationships states must recognize. Take federal laws and judicial opinions
that address the legal status and rights of nonmarital children. In the 1940s,
50s, and 60s, many states denied nonmarital children’s claims for federal
assistance on the grounds that there was a “substitute father” in the house—
even when the man in question had no legal familial obligation to the child.58
Congress and federal regulators sought to end this practice, and protect
nonmarital children, by outlawing the states’ “man in the house” rules.59
Relatedly, in a string of constitutional opinions issued from the late 1960s
through the early 1980s, the Supreme Court recognized “illegitimate”
children’s constitutional right to equal protection.60
How did state officials’ reactions to these federal regulatory, statutory, and
constitutional efforts to recognize the rights of nonmarital children shape the
development of family law in the several states? There is considerable
evidence that some state officials responding to these regulations and rulings
engaged in what Gerken and her co-author Jessica Bulman-Pozen have called
“uncooperative federalism”: when state officials charged with implementing
federal policies use their power to erode the foundations of those policies.61 If
that is the case, might a clearer understanding of that resistance help explain
why, according to some family law scholars, significant vestiges of the “old
law” of illegitimacy remains with us, notwithstanding late twentieth-century
efforts to disestablish that body of law?62 In short, we know that federal
programs often mingle state and federal definitions of who counts as a family
member, and some scholars have provided careful micro-studies of the role of
family law in different federal regulatory regimes.63 But in comparison with
58

See WINFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1965).
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), provides a thorough account of the federal
legislative and regulatory efforts to prevent the states from excluding nonmarital children
from AFDC, and resistance by many state officials to those efforts. See also BELL, supra
note 58, at 1-39, 76-110; Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social
Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
60 See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968). For a searching
analysis of the illegitimacy cases, see Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the
Constitution of the Non-Marital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
61 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009).
62 See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011); Melissa Murray, What’s So New
About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012).
63 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L.
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fields in which significant energy has been spent trying to determine how
federal and state regulatory integration works (or does not work), and how it
shapes substantive law, family law and federalism have benefited from far less
detailed descriptive and prescriptive work.64
My first point is a simple one: federalism theories that assume that family
law falls within a timeless and nearly impermeable zone of state authority
obscure the far messier, textured, interesting reality of the past and present
regulation of family law and policy—a reality that Gerken’s account of
federalism would have us acknowledge rather than repress. One reason
sovereignty-based theories of federalism thrive is that judges want
generalizable principles and neat and tidy jurisdictional lines to help them
decide cases.65 But there are costs. One of those costs is epistemic: as long as
we are constrained by assumptions about state sovereignty in the field of
family law, we will remain ill-equipped to understand how complicated powersharing arrangements involving local, state, and federal officials have shaped
family law—and how various efforts to regulate, subsidize, and tax the family
have shaped the practice of federalism.
II
If sovereignty talk tends to naturalize a simplified account of the allocation
of regulatory authority over the family, it also tends to obscure recurring
debates over family law’s place in our federal structure. As Gerken and others
have observed, federalism’s doctrines and structures are the product of, and are
sites of contestation concerning, different models of decentralized power.66
Efforts to draw jurisdictional lines around family law—itself an evolving and
protean category67—have been no exception to this history of contestation. In
turn, this history reveals that claims regarding the states’ special sovereignty
REV. 269 (2014); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the
Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Grace Ganz
Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32 STAN. L. REV. 233, 257 (1980).
64 The point is a relative one, of course. In a forthcoming article, Courtney Joslin seeks to
“provide a set of values or factors that should guide the assessment of when and how the
federal government should participate in the realm of family status determinations.”
Courtney Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015). Others
have engaged these questions. See, e.g., Estin, supra note 30; Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism
and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 541, 542 (1998); Law, supra note 30.
However, as Jill Hasday demonstrates in her recent book, federal family law—and, I would
add, the questions generated by jurisdictional overlap in the field of family law—remain
outside “the family law canon.” See HASDAY, supra note 19, at 17-66.
65 Cf. Resnik, supra note 18, at 620.
66 See, e.g., ALISON LACROIX, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2012);
Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 3, at 902-04; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 61,
at 1271-84.
67 For an important discussion of the genealogy of family law as a field, see Janet Halley,
What Is Family Law? A Genealogy (pts. 1 & 2), 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 & 189 (2011).
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over the family often have been developed in the course of opposing
challenges to traditional status-based family law principles. That observation
may meet resistance from some federalism scholars and jurists who embrace
federalism and rightly celebrate its many virtues—and, most recently, the role
it played in the undoing of Section 3 of DOMA. But one need not undervalue
federalism to acknowledge that it has been enlisted frequently as a rejoinder to
efforts to bring equality principles to bear on American family law. As long as
the sovereignty-based theory of federalism and family law remains a
naturalized feature of “our federalism,” however, that theory will sound as a
positive assertion about the nature of American federalism rather than as a
prescriptive claim that has developed in part to preserve particular socio-legal
family arrangements—arrangements that benefited some while disempowering
or excluding others. Simply put, while federalism was used (successfully) to
help dislodge DOMA, claims to family law’s essentially localist nature have
frequently worked to preserve rather than unsettle inegalitarian family law
principles.
Thanks to the efforts of historians and legal scholars who have studied the
development of localist theories of family law, there is no shortage of
examples of this phenomenon, past and present. Early nineteenth-century
articulations of the sovereignty-based theory of federalism and family law
excavated by Jill Hasday serve as a useful starting point. In the 1820s, national
legislators intent on defeating efforts to admit Missouri as a free state warned
their anti-slavery colleagues that federal “intervention” in the regulation of
slavery would inevitably lead to disruption of other areas of domestic relations
law.68 They portrayed a slippery slope on which federal efforts to dismantle the
master-slave relationship—then considered a “domestic relation”—would lead
to other radical changes to the state laws that structured the household around
men’s authority and women’s limited autonomy, and would all but require the
enfranchisement of women.69
Those objections were insufficient to prevent Reconstruction reforms from
reaching the domestic relation of master and slave, but—thanks to Reva
Siegel’s searching analysis of anti-suffrage arguments developed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—we know that anxieties concerning
federal intrusion into the family and women’s claims to political equality were
durable and salient.70 Although the restriction of women’s political
participation hardly seems like a species of “family law” today, one would not
have known that during the seventy-year-long fight over woman suffrage.
“Among the powers which have hitherto been esteemed as most essential to
the public welfare, is the power of the States to regulate, each for itself, their
domestic institutions in their own way,” explained an 1882 minority report of
68

See Hasday, supra note 18, at 1327-38.
See id.
70 Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998-1003 (2002).
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the Senate Select Committee on Woman Suffrage, “and among those
institutions none have been preserved by the States with greater jealousy than
their absolute control over marriage and the relation between the sexes.”71 As
Siegel demonstrates, the federalism rejoinder to women’s claims to equal
citizenship identified women’s disenfranchisement as constitutive of the
marital relationship, and insisted that the states possessed special sovereignty
over marriage.
This federalism argument was not a minor part of the suffrage debate; it was
a routine and core feature of the anti-suffrage argument that, after women
began voting, was also used to resist federal social policy initiatives supported
by newly enfranchised reform-minded women. For example, opponents of
Progressive-era efforts to create federal programs and infrastructure intended
to alleviate grinding poverty among widowed and abandoned mothers and
children marshaled similar federalism-based objections to the work of the
federal Children’s Bureau and to the relatively short-lived Sheppard-Towner
Act, a public health measure designed to provide federal aid to the states to
improve their maternal and child health facilities.72 Although claims to state
sovereignty over family law did not block the passage of the Social Security
Acts of 1935 and 1939, with their various programs designed to help children,
mothers, and widows, federalism-based arguments undoubtedly shaped the
Acts’ race- and class-stratified treatment of women and families—a point that
has been meticulously chronicled by historians.73
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, despite considerable
change in the federal structure—and the undeniable growth of federal
regulatory regimes and programs that defined, subsidized, taxed, and obligated
families and their members in various ways—the argument that the family is a
special enclave of state sovereignty has continued to shape the contours of
federal and state family law and policy. Objections to the ill-fated Equal Rights
Amendment to the federal Constitution frequently sounded—and continue to

71

S. Rep. No. 47-686, pt. 2, at 2 (1882) (quoted in Siegel, supra note 70, at 1000).
Maternity and Infancy (Sheppard-Towner) Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921). On the
history of the federal Children’s Bureau and the Sheppard-Towner Act, see MOLLY LADDTAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE, 1890-1930, at 148-66
(1994); SKOCPOL, supra note 19, at 480-524. The federalism-based challenge to the
Sheppard-Towner Act was rejected by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 479 (1923), but federalism concerns were part of the steady criticism of the Act
and informed Congress’s refusal to renew the Act in the late 1920s. See SKOCPOL, supra
note 19, at 513-14.
73 See Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 402, 49 Stat. 620, 627-28 (1935) (aid to dependent
children); Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360 (benefits for
wives and widows). For discussions of how federalism shaped the various Social Security
programs intended for women, see LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, ch. 9 (1994); SKOCPOL, supra note 19,
at 534-36.
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sound—in federalism.74 Similarly, as Judith Resnik has demonstrated,
proposals that the United States ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)—a treaty that requires
signatory countries to take steps to eliminate discrimination against women—
have been met with the contention that such an obligation would “bring federal
and even international regulation into areas which are constitutionally reserved
to state, local or private discretion.”75 Allied arguments have been made in
opposition to ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.76 In the
mid-1990s, sovereignty-based federalism theories featured prominently in
efforts to defeat the passage of the Violence Against Women Act—an act that
was intended to help secure women’s equality by targeting the problem of
“gender motivated violence.”77 Although VAWA was enacted, its opponents in
Congress successfully limited its scope in various ways.78 And in Morrison v.
United States,79 the Supreme Court further limited VAWA when it ruled that
the Act’s civil rights remedy was unconstitutional, reasoning that the
regulation of violence against women involved matters that were “truly local”
and thus beyond the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.80
This summary catalogue of ways in which sovereignty-based theories of
federalism have been enlisted in efforts to defeat or limit federal initiatives that
challenged status-based relationships created by traditional family law (or that
were perceived to do so) is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it offered to support
the contention that sovereignty-based theories of federalism always work
against efforts to develop a more egalitarian or dignity-enhancing family law
apparatus. Such theories have also served the ends of progressive change by
preventing the ossification of illiberal norms in federal law, thus enabling the
74 See, e.g., Extending the Ratification Period for the Proposed Equal Rights
Amendment: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 179 (1978) (letter of Phyllis Schlafly)
(arguing that the “ERA is the centerpiece of the women’s lib movement for more Federal
control over our lives, lesbian privileges to teach in the schools and have child custody,
government-funded abortions, and Federal child-care to replace mother-care”).
75 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 36, 85 (1990) (statement of
Phyllis Schlafly). See Resnik, supra note 18, at 665-67.
76 S. Res. 133, 104th Cong. (1995); Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the
Children? A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 171-72 (2006).
77 Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”), § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941, 1941.
78 For a discussion of the legislators’ efforts to address criticism that early forms of
VAWA would improperly involve the federal government in domestic relations matters, see
Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against
Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1996).
79 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
80 Id. at 617-19. For extensive discussions of VAWA, see Resnik, supra note 18, at 62629; Siegel, supra note 70, at 1025-31.
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states to experiment with more progressive alternatives, and, as Gerken
observes, to “tug” the federal government along. Windsor is just one example
of this phenomenon.81 In addition, it is absolutely not the case that that federal
laws that regulate family membership and the rights and responsibilities
associated with it are, by virtue of their federal-ness, wise, progressive, or
equality promoting.82
Rather, the point is that a clear-eyed description of how federalism has
shaped family law and policy—and how family law has shaped the practice of
federalism—must account for the fact that sovereignty-based theories of
federalism often served to shield traditional, status-based family law principles
from pressure for change. At different junctures, such pressure for change has
been generated at the national level by and on behalf of individuals and groups
seeking recognition of their status as members of families (e.g., former slaves),
claiming equality within legally recognized families (e.g., nonmarital children),
and claiming equality in the public sphere despite their status as members of
families (e.g., married women). Efforts to defeat such claims using
sovereignty-based theories of federalism have not always prevailed, as the
significant body of federal family laws and policies attests. But assertions that
family is “truly local” not only naturalize a flat, anemic understanding of the
place of the family in our federal system but also tend to obscure the ways that
claims to state sovereignty have frequently inhibited progressive change in
family law and related fields.
III
How might this account of concurrent, overlapping federal and state
regulation of the family, and of federalism’s role in helping to preserve
traditional family law principles, provide perspective on Windsor and the
ongoing debate over federalism and same-sex marriage? A full answer would
extend far beyond the scope of this Comment, so in closing I focus on how the
history outlined above cautions us to be mindful of the ways that federalism

81 For example, in debates over the Federal Marriage Amendment, opponents used the
state-sovereignty theory of federalism to defeat a constitutional amendment that would have
ossified a heterosexual-only vision of marriage in the federal constitution. See, e.g., Bruce
Fein, Marriage Amendment Miscue, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A19 (arguing that the
Federal Marriage Amendment “precludes [state] legislative bodies from recognizing samesex unions irrespective of majority sentiments”). In the early twentieth century, federalism
principles appear to have played a role in preventing the enactment of proposed federal
constitutional amendments that would have constitutionalized a ban on interracial marriage.
See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States
Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 630 (2004).
82 Family law scholars have offered powerful and thoughtful critiques of current federal
adoption law, federal welfare policies, and federal child support laws. See, e.g., Christina
White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and Safe
Families Act, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 303, 320-21 (2006).
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may be used not only to “clear the channels of political change”83 and further
“Fourteenth Amendment values,”84 as Gerken observes of Windsor, but also to
obstruct those channels of change and insulate family law from those values.85
One sees this possibility in the Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion in DeBoer v.
Snyder, which offers a reading of Windsor—and rests on a conception of
federalism—that is different from Gerken’s in very important respects.
For a time, it appeared that the federalism logic of Windsor would die an
uncelebrated death. As same-sex couples lined up to challenge state
constitutional and statutory bars on same-sex marriage, court after court—
federal and state, trial and appellate—adopted Windsor’s equality and liberty
rationales.86 Some courts simply ignored the federalism language and logic of
Windsor, while others openly rejected it.87 When, on October 6, 2014, the
Supreme Court unceremoniously denied the petitions for certiorari in seven of
those cases,88 it seemed that the commentators who had dismissed the
federalism talk in Windsor as largely irrelevant were right. But exactly one
month later, when the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in DeBoer,89 the
federalism rationale of Windsor took center stage.
Writing for a divided panel, Judge Jeffrey Sutton dismisses Windsor’s
rights-based reasoning as immaterial to an assessment of the constitutionality
of state marriage laws, observing that “federalism permeates” Windsor and that

83

Gerken, supra note 2, at 600.
Id. at 595.
85 As Gerken notes, “the gears of rights and structure can move backwards, not just
forwards.” Id. at 599-600.
86 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760
F.3d 375, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2014);
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel.
Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d
542, 550-52 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483 (E.D. Va. 2014);
Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); De Leon v.
Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759,
767-68 (M.D. Tenn. 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768, 775 (E.D. Mich.
2014); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1045, 1048-49 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Obergefell
v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979-80, 983 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1194, 1200 (D. Utah 2013); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336,
367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 876, 887 (N.M. 2013).
87 For opinions that largely ignore the federalism logic of Windsor, see Obergefell, 962
F. Supp. 2d 968; Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252; Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542; Gray v. Orr, 4
F. Supp. 3d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2013). In Bostic v. Schaefer the Fourth Circuit explicitly discounts
Windsor’s federalism language, reasoning that “Windsor does not teach us that federalism
principles can justify depriving individuals of their constitutional rights . . . .” 760 F.3d at
379.
88 See, e.g., Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
89 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
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“[o]nly federalism” can explain “[w]hy . . . DOMA [was] anomalous.”90 The
DeBoer majority reasons that the constitutionality of state marriage
requirements turns on an institutional question: “Who decides?”91 According to
the DeBoer majority, this question has only two possible answers: either “the
Supreme Court will constitutionalize a new definition of marriage” or “the
people, gay and straight alike,” will “meet today’s challenge admirably and
settle the issue in a productive way . . . through the customary political
processes” at the state level.92
After framing the issue in this manner, the DeBoer majority then reaffirms
the proposition that the states (and, in particular, “state voters”) traditionally
have had nearly exclusive power to define marriage. Much of the opinion’s
discussion of federalism sounds in tones of process federalism and embraces
the role that state-level deliberation has played in changing the “hearts and
minds” of Americans on the subject of same-sex marriage. Federalism
“permits laboratories of experimentation”93 and allows federated democracies
to pace change in a way that provides stability.94 However, there is no
mistaking the prominent and pivotal role of sovereignty-based theories of
federalism in DeBoer. The majority opinion repeatedly cites to and affirms the
states’ “time-respected authority to define the marital relation”95 and “longheld authority to define marriage.”96 “When the Framers ‘split the atom of
sovereignty,’” the DeBoer majority explains, “they did so to enhance liberty,
not to allow the National Government to divest liberty protections granted by
the States in the exercise of their historic and in this instance nearly exclusive
power.”97
A similar principle insulates each state’s marriage laws from the policy
choices of other states. Addressing a challenge to Section 2 of DOMA—which
provides that the individual states may refuse recognition of a same-sex
marriage formalized in another state—the DeBoer majority opinion reasons
that “[p]reservation of a State’s authority to recognize, or to opt not to
recognize, an out-of-state marriage preserves a State’s sovereign interest in
deciding for itself how to define the marital relationship.”98 In the legal
universe portrayed in DeBoer, then, the states are truly islands when it comes
to marriage, and the only legitimate avenue for change available to proponents
of same-sex marriage is the state ballot box.
90

Id. at 414.
Id. at 396.
92 Id. at 421.
93 Id. at 406.
94 Id. at 406-07.
95 Id. at 414.
96 Id.
97 Id. (citation omitted).
98 Id. at 419; see Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419,
2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
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The DeBoer majority explains the significance of this theory of federalism
for the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims with great clarity: “Not one of the
plaintiffs’ theories . . . makes the case for constitutionalizing the definition of
marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the
founding: in the hands of state voters.”99 Indeed, in the majority’s view, “[t]he
States’ undoubted power over marriage provides an independent basis for
reviewing the [state heterosexual-only marriage] laws . . . with deference rather
than with skepticism.”100 Independent from what? Independent from, and in
addition to, existing standards of deference that are part and parcel of modern
constitutional equal protection analysis. The DeBoer majority thus appears to
develop a synthetic account of federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment in
which the states’ sovereignty over family law extends into the domain of
constitutional elaboration and enforcement, mandating judicial and
congressional deference to the states with respect to family law—a deference
that the majority likens to the federal government’s plenary authority over the
status and rights of noncitizens.101
What should one make of the DeBoer majority’s reading of Windsor and its
account of the allocation of authority between federal and state institutions
with respect to family law and policy? There is much to be said about the
DeBoer majority’s reasoning, and surely much more will be said in briefs and
commentary leading up to the Supreme Court’s review. Here, I make just two
observations. First, it is important to underscore the novelty of the DeBoer
majority’s synthetic reading of equal protection and the state-sovereignty
theory of domestic relations law. The constitutionalization of family law is a
well-observed phenomenon—lamented by some and celebrated by others.102 In
DeBoer, however, state sovereignty creates a special zone of constitutional
deference around state marriage law. Depending on the contours of that zone
of deference, which the majority opinion does not delineate clearly, the
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DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 402-03.
Id. at 415.
101 Id. at 415-17. The DeBoer majority thus advances a theory of “noncongruent equal
protection”—when a federal court’s “equal protection scrutiny” differs depending on
whether a state or federal law is at issue. See Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent
Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 171 (2014). The DeBoer majority focuses
primarily on the extremely limited role that, in its view, the federal courts may play in
enforcing constitutional principles in the domain of family law, but it also uses the
sovereignty logic of Windsor to question Congress’s power, following federal judicial
recognition of a right to same-sex marriage, to use its “Section 5 enforcement powers to add
new definitions and extensions of marriage rights in the years ahead.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at
415.
102 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 80-81, 282-84 (1989); Michael
Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States, 1950-2000, in
CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 3, 4-5
(Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000).
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resulting constitutional framework would mark a change by significantly
limiting the role that federal due process and equal protection principles play in
family law.103 But the majority presents its theory of constitutional deference
as an essential and inevitable outgrowth of the states’ “historic and . . . nearly
exclusive power” over family law, thus obscuring a significant departure from
present constitutional practice. There is nothing unusual about this form of
argument.104 The intellectual and discursive conventions of legal practice
frequently push judges and lawyers to account for constitutional developments
in ways that call on historical sources as authority while enlisting those sources
to support changes in legal standards. The founders, in this convention, often
function as a source not of precedent, but of “timeless elements out of a past
that [are] assumed to be ‘correct’ or ‘providential’ . . . or ‘clear,’” infusing a
judicial opinion with the aura of inevitability and certitude.105
However, as the history of federal and state allocations of power over family
law and contestation over such power demonstrate, the family’s place in our
federated polity is neither inevitable nor certain. It is contingent and changing.
“State voters,” usually acting through their legislators, have played a primary
role in the regulation of the family. But officials operating at every level of
government—federal judges, state judges, government lawyers of all sorts,
municipal officials, low-level administrative officials in federal and state
agencies, and legislators in Washington—have also shaped the legal definition
and meaning of marriage over time. That process has sometimes been
103 Few if any modern constitutional interpreters would suggest that such a theory would
alter the outcome of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The DeBoer majority
distinguishes Loving as a case involving something other than the “definition” of marriage:
Loving concerned an “eligibility requirement for marriage; it did not create a new definition
of marriage.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411. Even assuming that distinction to be tenable, no
explanation is given for why an “eligibility requirement” of the sort at issue in Loving or
other cases involving the right to marry is any less central to the states’ “undoubted power
over marriage.” See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978). The Supreme Court has also regularly subjected laws that govern the rights
and responsibilities of marriage to federal equal protection and due process standards. See,
e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins.
Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). Similarly, starting
in the late 1960s, the Court subjected state laws governing the rights and status of
nonmarital children and their parents to constitutional review. See, e.g., Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
104 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 11 (2011) (“Most successful political and
social movements in America’s history have claimed authority for change in just this way:
either as a call to return to the enduring principles of the Constitution or as a call for
fulfillment of those principles.”).
105 Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
201, 215 (1990).
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evolutionary, sometimes revolutionary; sometimes cooperative, sometimes
contested; sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent. Some of the most
significant changes—Reconstruction-era efforts to recognize the marriages of
emancipated slaves, woman suffrage, New Deal social welfare programs, and
the end of state anti-miscegenation laws—brought federal power to bear on
family relationships in very direct ways. The static and simplified account of
the federal-state allocation of power with respect to family law that is affirmed
and reinforced by the DeBoer majority obscures these complex institutional
processes and changes, and instead portrays a particular sovereignty-based
conception of federalism and family law as transhistorical—the one true
federalism to which we must adhere.
My second observation is that, just as the DeBoer majority’s synthetic
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment and federalism is predicated on a
limited understanding of the past, its begrudging assessment of same-sex
marriage plaintiffs’ turn to federal courts is premised on a misguided account
of modern institutional processes and practices.106 The opinion at once
acknowledges the plaintiffs’ right to turn to federal court and questions that
course:
If the plaintiffs are convinced that litigation is the best way to resolve
today’s debate and to change heads and hearts in the process, who are we
to say? . . . [H]owever . . . we cannot deny thinking the plaintiffs deserve
better—earned victories through initiatives and legislation and the greater
acceptance that comes with them.107
Observing that proponents of same-sex marriage have achieved “nearly as
many successes as defeats” through the “customary political processes”—and
reasoning that “the federal courts have no long-lasting capacity to change what
people think and believe about new social questions”108—the DeBoer majority
concludes that the plaintiffs’ claims do not belong in federal court at all.109
106 Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey’s dissenting opinion in DeBoer makes a similar
observation. See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 435 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (“[A]s it turns out,
legalization of same-sex marriage in the ‘nineteen states and the District of Columbia’
mentioned by the majority was not uniformly the result of popular vote or legislative
enactment.”).
107 Id. at 417 (majority opinion).
108 Id.
109 The DeBoer majority does not cite Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring About Social Change?, though it appears to rely on Rosenberg’s well-known
argument that “courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social
reform”—an argument Rosenberg has extended to the same-sex marriage debate. See
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
422 (2d ed. 2008). The majority does cite Michael Klarman’s important contribution to the
debate over the role that courts can play in social change. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE (2012). However, while Klarman observes that litigation has retarded the cause
of gay marriage in some ways, he also notes the numerous ways that litigation has
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Instead, the legal definition of marriage belongs where “it has been since the
founding: in the hands of state voters.”110
The DeBoer majority’s assertion that gay and lesbian “interest groups” have
been “succeeding more and failing less” through “democratic initiatives”111
and, in part for that reason, that their claims have no place in federal court or
Congress, elides the role that various institutions—state and federal,
administrative, legislative, and judicial—have played in “chang[ing] what
people think and believe” about same-sex marriage. A more accurate account
would acknowledge the role of courts—state and federal—in the same-sex
marriage debate, recognizing them as integral to the processes of legal and
social change, not orthogonal to those processes. Long before Windsor, federal
courts helped raise the federal constitutional floor of gay and lesbian rights,
most notably in Romer v. Evans112 and Lawrence v. Texas113—two opinions
that the DeBoer majority finds irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ claims.114 In turn,
state courts—conspicuously absent from the DeBoer majority’s account of
legitimate institutional forums for the marriage-equality debate115—have relied
in part on federal constitutional jurisprudence in resolving state constitutional
challenges to heterosexual-only marriage laws.116 And, as Bill Eskridge has
“advanced the cause of gay marriage.” Id. at 208-19.
110 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403.
111 Id. at 415.
112 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
113 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
114 See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 401-02, 408-09, 414-19, 431-32.
115 The DeBoer majority references the role of state courts in the “victories” of the samesex marriage movement, but it also questions the legitimacy of state courts’ rulings in favor
of same-sex marriage, characterizing those courts as having “seiz[ed] control” of the
definition of marriage. See id. at 408-09.
116 An exemplary passage from Goodridge v. Department of Public Health illustrates this
point:
The history of constitutional law “is the story of the extension of constitutional rights
and protections to people once ignored or excluded.” United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 557 (1996). This statement is as true in the area of civil marriage as in any
other area of civil rights. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
798 N.E.2d 941, 966 (2003). Of course, state courts grappling with state constitutional
challenges to heterosexual-only marriage laws also draw on and develop their own state’s
constitutional jurisprudence in the course of deciding those cases, as the Goodridge court
made clear: “The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty against
government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the Federal Constitution,
even where both Constitutions employ essentially the same language.” Id. at 959 (citations
omitted). My point is not to measure the influence of state and federal constitutional
precedent in the marriage-equality cases, but to suggest that state courts’ use of federal
constitutional case law and norms should be accounted for as one considers the various
federal, state, and local legal norms and institutions that have played a role in the same-sex
marriage debate.
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demonstrated in great detail, constitutional litigation (state and federal) has
served as an agenda-setting device for proponents of same-sex marriage, has
enabled them to reverse the inertia they faced in legislatures, and has allowed
gay and lesbian couples to falsify anti-gay stereotypes117—both outside of
court in their everyday lives and in court through careful examination of expert
testimony offered for and against same-sex marriage.118
Other federal officials have also played a role in the “victories” of the samesex marriage movement. The most visible example of the federal executive
branch’s support for recognition of same-sex marriage is Attorney General
Eric Holder’s well-publicized letter to Congress in 2011 announcing the
Department of Justice’s decision to cease defending DOMA, but lower-profile
decisions contributed to the movement’s successes as well.119 In short, one
need not deny the importance of state-level deliberative institutions in the
process of social and legal change, or claim an outsized significance for federal
institutions, to recognize that the DeBoer majority’s account fails to capture
the institutional complexities that have characterized the same-sex marriage
debate to date.
There is nothing unusual about the way the same-sex marriage debate has
unfolded in multiple institutional settings—local, state, and federal. Gerken’s
federalism scholarship invites us to peel back the layers of our governance
structures, and to pay attention to how the states “tug” at the federal
government, and to consider how federalism promotes dialogue among and
between actors in different levels of government. Once we do this, we see that
the federal, state, and local overlap in the field of family law has long been part
of the practice of American federalism.
As I have demonstrated, the DeBoer majority offers a very different
interpretation of Windsor, a very different vision of federalism, and a very
different understanding of the process of legal change. It insists that the only
legitimate venue for changing marriage law is the state ballot box and that
when it comes to domestic relations, states are policy-making islands. The
117

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has
Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 309-22 (2013). See
also Thomas Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT
Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151 (2009).
118
See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
119 See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Hon.
John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
6Z25-HPJP. By digging deeper into the sources, one can find important evidence of the
ways that federal lawyers and administrators limited DOMA’s reach long before the
executive branch officially repudiated the law. See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, Mem. Op. for
Acting Gen. Counsel Soc. Sec. Admin. (Oct. 16, 2007) (finding that DOMA did not bar the
award of Social Security benefits to the non-biological child of one member of a Vermont
civil union).
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importance of the same-sex marriage movement’s victories in state legislatures
cannot be questioned. Many proponents of same-sex marriage have observed
that lasting change and acceptance of same-sex marriage is impossible without
tangible success in the political branches or through direct democracy, much of
which happens at the state and local levels.120 But acknowledging the
importance of political processes and local grassroots initiatives is very
different from insisting that “state voters” are the only source of legitimate and
permissible change to marriage law,121 and dismissing plaintiffs from federal
court in part for that reason. The former recognizes and values the central role
of state political institutions in bringing about social and legal change; the
latter views those institutions as virtually uncheckable organs of sovereign
power.
It is clear, however, that the marriage equality movements’ electoral
victories have not been, and will never be, the pristine exercises of state
electoral power that the DeBoer majority imagines. Indeed, once the DeBoer
majority’s assertions concerning state voters’ nearly exclusive authority over
the family are placed in context, historical and modern, we see that those
arguments are less about what “our federalism” is and more about how
federalism and constitutional principles of equality and liberty ought to operate
in the field of family law. The debate over what the place of the family in our
federal constitutional democracy should be is an important one—and one that
Americans have been having for centuries. Given the prominent role of
historical reasoning in constitutional contestation and decision making, that
debate is also understandably one in which claims regarding past allocation of
regulatory power have featured prominently.
Disagreement concerning the history of the allocation of regulatory
authority over the family will surely continue in the coming months, as the
Supreme Court grapples with the constitutional status of state heterosexualonly marriage laws. As government officials, lawyers, and judges consider
how history informs their assessment of the constitutionality of these marriage
laws, they should be equipped with a candid acknowledgment of the limits of
our knowledge of the past and an appreciation of the many forms American
federalism has taken. They should acknowledge the complex integration of
federal, state, and local family laws, and the overlapping regulatory regimes
that administer those laws. Finally, they should be mindful of the myriad ways
that sovereignty-based federalism theories have been, and can be, used to
entrench inegalitarian family law policies.
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This has been the view of many within the same-sex marriage movement. See
KLARMAN, supra note 109, at 215-17.
121 Windsor certainly does not suggest this to be the case. Instead, it notes that states’
power to regulate domestic relations is “[s]ubject to certain constitutional guarantees.”
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).

